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Fission-Fusion Cognition in Shakespearean Drama: The Case for Julius Caesar1 
 
Miranda Anderson 
 
This paper examines how Renaissance notions of the mind and the subject, as 
constrained and constituted by social means, are narrated and staged in Shakespeare’s Julius 
Caesar. This analysis is supplemented by a few references to Montaigne’s Essays, whose 
influence on Shakespeare and concern with the nature of the mind and self are long established 
(Ellrodt). To further ground the case, it begins with two brief overviews: firstly, on 
narratological approaches to drama and their particular relevance to Renaissance drama, and 
secondly, on various current approaches to social cognition. I focus on the linked concepts that 
a multiplicity of agents can operate within a single human being, and conversely that multiple 
individuals can form a cognitive unit. These related notions of the mind as social, both in 
Renaissance fictional and factual narratives and in current cognitive science, are understood to 
be due to human psychophysiological capacities. These capacities both afford and require 
boundaries and flow between the constituent parts of the self, both as regards those within skull 
or skin, and as regards those in the world. As I want to highlight the issue of divisions, as well 
as sharing, between individuals and within an individual I have adopted the physics term 
“fission-fusion,” which has been used by ethology to describe dynamic social networks that 
periodically merge and divide, and I have reapplied it specifically to cognition in order to 
capture the malleable and shifting nature of the cognitive units formed (Aureli et al.). 
 
Dramatizing narrative 
 
Piece out our imperfections with your thoughts . . . For ’tis your thoughts that now must 
deck our kings . . . (Henry V 1.1.23, 1.1.28) 
 
This famous prologue might initially seem a more likely candidate than the prologue-
less Julius Caesar for a defence of a narratological reading of the social mind in Renaissance 
drama. Firstly, because the appeal to the audience implies their participation is necessary for 
an effective creation of the playworld. Secondly, because prologues have been interpreted as 
providing a structural equivalent to the narrator’s role in prose fiction, on which classical 
definitions of narrative have traditionally drawn. Yet research on Renaissance English 
playscripts from around 1600 suggests that such narratologically-attuned framing features as 
prologues, choruses, and epilogues, were not necessarily permanent, but were often created for 
first or for special performances only, with many lost and a few relocated from one play to 
another (Stern). They are temporary, absent, or unreliable features. This capacity of a play to 
dispense with a single explicit privileged narrator and to instead leave only a polyphonic array 
of characters is in itself suggestive of the relevance of drama to exploring notions of the social 
mind; this capacity also obliquely indicates the relevance of more recent notions of narratology 
that are not dependent on structures derived from a narrator’s roles. 
 Monika Fludernik bases drama’s inclusion in narratological studies on its ability to 
evoke experientiality and a fictional world, with the minimum requirement the presence of a 
character on stage (“Narrative and Drama”). Fludernik further describes the way the developing 
novel adopted the “deep-structural patterns of drama” (“Diachronization” 343). In turn, as 
Barbara Hardy relates, Shakespeare makes narrative theatrical, for as Hardy argues: 
“[n]arrative is a primary act of mind, a way of comprehending and constructing social and 
psychic life, as inevitable and central a subject of drama as of prose fiction” (24). Furthermore, 
there is an additional level of richness to theatrical performance’s treatment of narrative, as 
Nünning and Sommer have described: 
 plays do not just represent narratives (i.e. a series of events), they also stage 
narratives in that, more often than not, they make storytelling, i.e. the art of 
telling narratives, theatrical. In other words, plays not only represent series of 
events [mimetic narrativity] they also represent ‘acts of narration,’ with 
characters serving as intradiegetic storytellers. (337) 
 
Therefore, rather than attempting to give an account of narrative in Shakespeare that attempts 
to comply with classical narrative notions, this paper will explore the ways in which 
Shakespeare himself reflexively employed narrative in one of his works. 
Regarding the anxiety to please that marks such entreaties as Puck’s promise, “[i]f you 
pardon, we will mend,” Tiffany Stern comments that not only these stage-orations but also the 
main script is open to revision; this possibility of revision emphasizes the potential impact an 
audience may have on a performance and even on a playscript (119). The presumed priority 
and dominance of playscript over performance is another feature discussed in narratological 
considerations of drama (for example, see Jahn 692); this dominance does not hold true for the 
Renaissance, and again suggests the social nature of the mind brought to bear on the playscript. 
Another feature considered in narrative accounts of drama are the stage direction that guide an 
actual performance or a reader’s virtualization of it (Schaeffer 257). Yet in Shakespeare the 
narratorial hand tends to operate through implicit instructions and narrative details embedded 
in the dialogue; these often combine metaphorical images with a demand for stage action, such 
as Ligarius’s statement “I here discard my sickness” (Shakespeare 2.1.320), which both 
symbolises his rejection of bondage and requires his removal of a dressing (see Pasternak Slater 
144 and Tribble). Fludernik describes fiction and drama as differing primarily on the discourse 
level, with drama offering the setting’s visual presentation instead of a verbal description 
(“Narrative and Drama” 361–62); this is less the case, though, with Shakespeare’s works, 
where background descriptions are often given as a verbal supplement to the relatively bare 
stage. In general, then, what would commonly constitute didascalia is embedded intratextually, 
and this indicates that Shakespearean drama is not quite as open to “pure invention” as has 
generally been imagined (Claycomb 173), although it lacks what Manfred Jahn calls the 
“controlling ‘frame’” of lengthy stage directions (672). 
 
Social Mind 
 
In his study of ship navigation, Ed Hutchins makes a case for cognitive systems as 
distributed through equipment, which incorporates aspects of necessary expertise, as well as 
through other social agents, like the ship’s navigational team that operates collectively as a 
computational system (155; xiv). The seminal paper on “The Extended Mind” by Andy Clark 
and David Chalmers mentions that one of the ways in which cognitive processes extend into 
the world is through other people (17). Deb Tollefsen elaborates on this with the hypothetical 
example of a forgetful philosopher and his wife Inga, who enables him to orient himself in the 
world. Stephen Kosslyn names this notion “social prosthetic systems” (SPSs): systems in 
which other social agents act as mind-extensions. SPSs are other people whom we “rely on . . 
. to extend our reasoning abilities and to help us regulate and constructively employ our 
emotions,” so that “other people’s brains come to serve as extensions of your own brain” 
(“What Do You Believe”). There is a distinction here, in that Hutchins’s accounts focus on 
collaborative group minds, rather than the socially extended minds, that assign generative and 
receptive functions to one individual or another, which are offered by Clark, Chalmers, 
Tollefsen, and Kosslyn: each account raises different issues of agency. Yet all of these accounts 
highlight the benefits of social extendedness, whereas psychoanalytic and postmodern accounts 
tend to expose the problematic elements while eliding the role of the body and the non-
sociocultural environment; both positive and negative aspects of social extendedness, and its 
relation to being embodied and embedded, are explored in this analysis of Renaissance texts, 
which themselves explore these concerns. 
The mirror neuron system has been credited with enabling socially extended cognition, 
since when one person watches another performing actions, experiencing emotions or narrating 
action words mirror neurons fire in the motor cortex as if the watcher were performing the 
actions and experiencing the emotions themselves (Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia). Commenting on 
the theatrical insights provided by the discovery of the mirror neuron system, Bruce 
McConachie reflects that “[o]ur ability to empathize with the experiences of others though 
mirroring is the cognitive hook that impels spectator interest in the activities of actor/characters 
and engages us in the unfolding narrative of a play” (18). Yet studies have shown that 
individuals with specialized experience of the action performed have a greater intensity of 
firing in the mirror neuron system than do non-experts (Calvo-Merino). So while mirror 
neurons indicate the potential for considerable sharing of experience across persons, this 
evidence suggests that there is also considerable particularity, due to the contingency of 
subjective experience (Anderson et al., “Involving Interface” 322). Theater is a medium with 
an immediate feedback loop between actors and audience, and yet since the mental states do 
not remain identical across different individuals, with the intensity of the mirror neuron firing 
affected by our own cognitive repertoire, it makes sense that one’s subjective experiences of 
theater, as with those in the world, involve consistencies and divergences with those of others. 
We experience fusions and fissions with a dramatic spectacle and with the reactions of others 
in an audience. 
 The human capacity to form ad hoc fusions as a means to undertake cognitive 
processing is underwritten by internal fissions. One’s subjective experience is also dependent 
on a number of contingencies, so that an individual’s experience of a play on one day or the 
next will also not be identical. A number of theories argue that distinct phenomenological 
experience is accompanied by internal fissions. Thomas Nagel argues that while third-person 
accounts leave out the subjective nature of consciousness, our “simple idea of a single person 
will come to seem quaint some day, when the complexities of the human control system 
become clearer and we become less certain that there is anything very important that we are 
one of” (164). While the function of consciousness is social, Jakob Hohwy posits, it is for this 
very reason that it remains private, as it thereby enables us to optimally integrate other people’s 
variant perceptual estimates of the world (254). Daniel Dennett instead proposes that the habit 
of adopting an “intentional stance,” that is, viewing behavior in terms of mental properties, 
spreads “to cover both other-interpretation and self-interpretation” (159); this implies a shared 
mechanism for making in inferences about our own and others’ mental experiences. Dennett’s 
notion that it is intersubjectivity that is primary and that precedes first-person subjectivity is 
echoed by both Alan Palmer and David Herman (Palmer, Fictional Minds 5, 178; Herman 762). 
Herman further argues against the pervasive literary theory of anti-intentionalism, which 
claims that it is an error to attempt to assess the intention of an author from his work. Herman 
points out that anti-intentionalism is counterintuitive to humans’ propensity to ascribe 
intentions to others, including authors and characters within works, instead he argues that this 
is as necessary and helpful a part of our readings of literature, as it is of people in real life. 
Furthermore, within literary texts this ascription of intentions is playfully explored: it is self-
consciously staged by Shakespeare in his works, which both depict and rely on humans’ 
propensity to observe others’ behavior, actions and words and thereby to ascribe attitudes and 
beliefs to them (both correctly and wrongly). 
 Charles Fernyhough highlights the social nature of many aspects of internal cognition. 
Yet this, he argues, places in question Alan Palmer’s emphasis on the distinction between 
intermental and intramental thought, although Palmer himself in fact argues that they form a 
“continuum” (Social Minds, 39). Fernyhough conceives of cognition in rather narrow 
postmodernist terms, calling it “fundamentally semiotic” (272-3). Were this view held valid, it 
would more markedly undermine Palmer’s achievement in shifting the focus on cognition in 
the novel from purely verbal forms to a wider spectrum, but Palmer’s broader view of cognition 
is supported both by his own works and by recent cognitive scientific research on the nontrivial 
roles that embodiment and environment play in cognitive processes. Palmer’s claim that mental 
states are not only conveyed through equivalent forms to speech acts in the novel is also 
pertinent here, since Shakespeare’s narratives, as well as being potentially enacted on a stage, 
contain embodied and experiential descriptions as a means to convey cognitive processes in 
action. 
 The Stanford Encyclopedia’s article on collective intentionality, which is defined as 
“the power of minds to be jointly directed at objects, matters of fact, states of affairs, goals, or 
values” acknowledges that “this part of the history of philosophy is largely unwritten,” as it 
skips from Aristotle to Rousseau and German Idealism in a few sentences, before going on to 
discuss movements from the late 19th century onwards in more detail (Schweikard and 
Schmid). This may have led to the type of risky claim made by Palmer that the debate on to 
“what extent is it possible to have knowledge of the workings of other minds?” and to “what 
purposes should our knowledge of other minds be put?” began in the early nineteenth century 
(Social Minds, 5). Evidence for such a debate on this enduring human trait in Julius Caesar is 
explored in the next section, and the further question of to what extent internal cognition also 
involves ad hoc coalitions of quasi-autonomous agencies that require first-person inference is 
touched on. Finally, another debate newly raised concerns the extent to which discourse 
between two characters constitutes a cognitive process (for further Renaissance instances see 
Anderson, The Renaissance Extended Mind). 
 
Julius Caesar 
The co-authoring of plays or re-use of source material results in a different form of 
creative collaboration than those discussed above. The story of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar is 
primarily based on Thomas North’s translation of Plutarch’s Lives of the Noble Greeks and 
Romans. A multiperspectival account of the murder scene progressively accumulates details 
across Plutarch’s lives of Julius Caesar, Brutus, and Antony in a way that Shakespeare mirrors 
in his play. The sudden onslaught of Caesar’s stabbing is staged and reported in metaleptical, 
proleptical, and analeptical narratives, which provoke a consideration of the respective merits 
of mimetic and diegetic media and of the power of their combined or independent use. Yet the 
narratives that evoke the workings of minds are more reliant on notions we also find expressed 
in Montaigne. Montaigne himself admired Plutarch, quoting him nearly 400 times in the essays, 
but the nature of the mind is little discussed in the relevant lives, except a brief but pertinent 
passage which depicts Cassius explaining to Brutus the senses, the humors, and the 
imagination’s pliability and unreliability (136). There are also a few brief conventional 
mentions of the conspirators as being “all of one mind”, of Cassius as “compelled against my 
mind and will” to wage all on the unsuccessful battle, and of “Cassius’ friends which were of 
his mind before” regarding the battle becoming “of Brutus’ mind” (118, 139).These helpfully 
gesture towards the everyday nature of notions of a fused group mind, cognitive fission, and 
socially extended cognition, but do not explore the ramifications as does Shakespeare. 
In a typically Shakespearean sleight of hand, Julius Caesar’s assassination by the 
conspirators is immediately followed by a metadramatic anticipation of its later theatrical 
performance. In Genette’s terms, albeit reapplied to drama, this plays on the “temporal duality” 
(Narrative Discourse 33) of the event in the world and in the play: 
 
CASSIUS  . . .  How many ages hence 
 Shall this our lofty scene be acted over 
 In states unborn and accents yet unknown! 
BRUTUS How many times shall Caesar bleed in sport, 
 That now on Pompey’s basis lies along 
 No worthier than the dust! 
CASSIUS  So oft as that shall be, 
 So often shall the knot of us be called 
 The men that gave their country liberty. (3.1.111-18) 
 
This simultaneously highlights the illusory and historically real nature of the scene, and yet 
rather than creating fission between actors and audience, it is creative of a conspiratorial 
intimacy. The characters are moved into a position of external focalization on their actions that 
more closely approximates and frames the audience’s reaction. It amplifies the audience’s 
involvement, as conversely the audience is seemingly sucked back in time out of their world 
to become witnesses to the aftermath of the original murder. This shared narrative, which 
imagines a future staging, indirectly appears to verify the reality of the current enactment, 
magnifying a sense of triumph. 
This is juxtaposed with Antony’s narrative, which foresees not future applause but the 
destructive sequence of events that will follow, and which grants a horrifying narrative agency 
to the speechless corpse: 
 
Over thy wounds now do I prophesy, 
(Which, like dumb mouths, do ope their ruby lips, 
To beg the voice and utterance of my tongue) 
A curse shall light upon the limbs of men; 
Domestic fury and fierce civil strife 
Shall cumber all the parts of Italy  (3.1.259-64) 
 
The capacity of the gory gaping body itself to speak and direct events, to spout blood flow 
through the ensuing scenes, is brought about through Antony’s giving voice and agency to it. 
Antony undercuts the self-aggrandizing narrative of the faction though the fusion of his identity 
with Caesar’s corpse, so enabling Caesar’s power to reach beyond his death. In describing the 
motivation for human co-operation in social prosthetic systems, Kosslyn writes that “if one 
perceives that one’s identity is distributed over the group, one will not perceive one’s death as 
obliterating the self—and to some extent, this perception is not erroneous” (“Evolution” 551). 
In such ways Caesar motivates events even posthumously (as Pompey’s statue looming over 
Caesar’s corpse also seems to achieve a posthumous revenge). 
Shakespeare simultaneously explores and exposes the combined techniques of showing 
and telling through which he himself moves the audience. Shakespeare plays on the concerns 
voiced by anti-theatricalists about playgoing, and by the elite about the underclasses, with both 
underprivileged groundlings and the nobility in the galleries making up his audience; the first, 
he mocks through his representation of the feigning Cassius who “loves no plays” (1.2.202), 
and the second, he prods through the many-voiced but seemingly single-minded “Plebeians.” 
Evoking both concerns, the tribune Flavius in the play’s opening lines comically commands: 
“Hence! home, you idle creatures, get you home! / Is this a holiday?” (1.1.1-2). The plebeians’ 
easily swayed group mind is first placated by Brutus’s account of the need for Caesar’s murder, 
then gradually roused back again to uproar by Antony: 
 
If you have tears, prepare to shed them now. 
You all do know this mantle: I remember 
The first time ever Caesar put it on; 
’Twas on a summer’s evening, in his tent, 
That day he overcame the Nervii: 
Look, in this place ran Cassius’ dagger through: 
See what a rent the envious Casca made: 
Through this the well-beloved Brutus stabbed; . . .  
For when the noble Caesar saw him stab, 
Ingratitude, more strong than traitor’s arms, 
Quite vanquished him: then burst his mighty heart; 
And, in his mantle muffling up his face, 
Even at the base of Pompey’s statua, 
Which all the while ran blood, great Caesar fell. 
O, what a fall was there, my countrymen! 
Then I, and you, and all of us fell down, 
Whilst bloody treason flourished over us. (3.2.167-74, 3.2.182-90) 
 
Antony generates the crowd’s pity and fury by pointedly juxtaposing one of Caesar’s martial 
triumphs with his violent stabbing by his supposed friends and with the loved Brutus striking 
the killing blow. Giovanna Colombetti discusses how the sharing of affective states across 
groups creates social bonding and collective action; and here it later leads to reckless rampage 
and the absurd murder of Cinna the poet only for sharing the name of Cinna the conspirator 
(194-202; 3.3). Antony further amplifies their empathy, by depicting the fall as not of Caesar 
alone, but of them all jointly at the conspirators’ hands, as physical and figural are 
superimposed. In this further reverberation of the assassination and of its earlier replay, Antony 
places the crowd at the scene in the same way the audience in the theater have been placed by 
Cassius’s and Brutus’s speeches, but here the crowd become the falling Caesar. This further 
reverberation also invites the audience’s critical self-reflexivity regarding their own cognitive 
and affective susceptibility and pliability. There is a doubling of engagement through the 
supplementation of the visual by the verbal and the verbal by the visual, with a climax the 
uncovering of the still bleeding body. Antony evokes immediacy and bloodiness in a 
graphically forceful and materially mediated way, so overturning Brutus’s spare and restrained 
rhetoric that appealed to rationality, virtue and honor as humanity’s motivating forces. He 
simultaneously claims for his account a transparency that he contrasts with Brutus’s rhetoric, 
further heightening the power of his physically figurative and anti-rhetorical rhetoric over the 
crowd. 
 Another angle on the difference is offered by Schaeffer, who distinguishes between 
forms of fiction in terms of “immersion vectors” (the means by which we access a fictional 
universe) and related “immersion postures” (the perspectives assigned to us by the vectors): 
these occur along an axis that stretches from “purely mental immersion (the one that is induced 
by a fictional tale) to immersion in an inner-worldly situation (the one of a theatre actor . . . )” 
(218-19). Schaeffer describes how the “simulation of inner-worldly elements” occurs in a 
theater, as the two universes of reality and fiction superimpose on each other: it uses real 
physical space, objects and human beings and therefore assigns to the spectator not the 
simulation of a perspective flux (as in the cinema), but a vector of “attending to events” (224). 
Yet Shakespeare’s theatrical works often simultaneously deploy a range of immersion vectors 
or set them against one another; for example, this scene elicits the human capacities for mental 
immersion through attending to a tale and through attending to onstage events. 
The narrative that sets this all in motion is Cassius’s claim to Brutus that he can act as 
mirror to his mind. Brutus’s third person account of himself to Cassius as internally fissured, 
“poor Brutus, with himself at war,” prompts Cassius’s cynical intervention. In a passage absent 
in Plutarch’s Lives, Cassius, who is intent on persuading Caesar’s protégé Brutus to participate 
in Caesar’s assassination, attempts to convince him of the necessity of socially extended 
reflexivity: 
 
CASSIUS.  Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face? 
BRUTUS.  No, Cassius, for the eye sees not itself 
 But by reflection, by some other things. 
CASSIUS.  ’Tis just; 
 And it is very much lamented, Brutus,  
 That you have no such mirrors as will turn 
 Your hidden worthiness into your eye, 
 That you might see your shadow . . .  
 And since you know you cannot see yourself 
 So well as by reflection, I, your glass, 
 Will modestly discover to yourself 
 That of yourself which you yet know not of. (1.2.50-60, 1.2.69-72) 
 
Cassius attempts to convince Brutus that the limits of perception, the inability of the face and 
the eyes to see themselves other than through the process of reflection, are akin to the limits of 
introspection, of a parallel psychological inability of the subject to apprehend its own qualities, 
without a form of socially extended reflexivity. Montaigne comments that others can often 
draw more from him than he can find in himself, and that sometimes when he has lost the point 
of what he was saying, that a stranger may discover it before he could (31-32). As in Dennett’s 
more extreme stance the mind is potentially more transparent to another than to oneself; and as 
in Kosslyn’s theory, other people’s minds are described as acting as cognitive supplements to 
one’s biological capacities. The significance of this offering of extended reflexivity can best 
be understood through attention to the distinctively human capacity of reflective knowledge in 
Renaissance schemas, since there is an understanding that what marks out the human mind is 
its ability to reflect on itself: “The difference between the Reason of man, and the Instinct of 
the beast is this, That the beast does but know, but the man knows that he knows” (Donne 8, ll. 
225). 
 But here Cassius proposes the external medium of his extrospective perspective instead 
as the necessary supplement to Brutus’s troubled introspection; this also suggests the way in 
which language utilizes and extends our capacity to be both receptive to and generative of 
cognition in others. Recast in Tollefsen’s terms, Cassius offers to act as an Inga for Brutus. Yet 
Shakespeare here explores the problematics of such cognitive social supplements. The self-
interest involved in Cassius’s claim to be the bearer of Brutus’s true reflection is revealed in 
an aside: “If I were Brutus now, and he were Cassius, / He should not humour me” (1.2.313-
14). This counterfactual exchange of positions counterpoints his explicit mirroring of Brutus. 
Cassius’s sense of superiority, despite his inferior social status, is due to his capacity to 
manipulate Brutus while remaining seemingly untouched and opaque. Yet again in the aside, 
support is given to the underlying notion of socially constituted cognitive processes and 
subjectivity: “Thy honourable mettle may be wrought / From that it is disposed. Therefore it is 
meet / That noble minds keep ever with their likes” (1.2.307-10). By the end, though, it is 
evident that Machiavellian minds are not immune to cognitive contagion either. So Cassius’s 
extrospective perspective here is shown to be problematically motivated by his own opaque 
subjective aims. The notion of cognitive reception and generation as potentially involving only 
a partial fusion, is echoed in the primarily one-way manipulation of the masses by Brutus and 
Antony. This latter aspect of social cognition can also be framed in terms of Karin Kukkonen’s 
theory of “top-heavy” social minds (“Top-Heavy Social Minds”).  
 The notion of cognitive and moral susceptibility ties in both with anti-theatricalists and 
pro-theatricalists’ beliefs about the capacity of theater: while Thomas White asserted that “the 
cause of plagues is sinne, if you looke to it well: and the cause of sinne are playes: therefore 
the cause of plagues are playes” (47), Thomas Heywood describes how theater “hath power to 
new mold the harts of the spectators and fashion them to the shape of any noble and notable 
attempt” (sig. B4r). Either way, theater is understood as an emulatory activity that morally 
alters and cognitively shapes the spectator. Shakespeare self-consciously stages the human 
tendency to observe others’ behavior, actions, and words and to ascribe attitudes and beliefs to 
them; this staging bears out the relevance of Herman’s argument about the general human 
propensity to employ intentionality and for us as readers or spectators to apply it in our analysis 
of Shakespeare. From another angle this reflects the problem with fusion indicated by Jakob 
Hohwy: by not simply merging another’s view with one’s own, by maintaining fission and 
resisting fusion, one retains a range of available interpretations; whereas to the extent one 
submits to fusion with another mind, one may be cognitively and morally altered for the worse. 
Conversely, though, such fusions may be for the better. In fact, it is Cassius who is morally and 
cognitively altered, for although he remains flawed, he ends by offering a noble albeit doomed 
verbal mirroring of Brutus. Rather than the anti-theatricalists, then, we might argue for a 
theatrical staging of the positive pro-theatricalist narrative with a touching (though not 
untroubled) reciprocity in the final scenes, in contradistinction to the earlier proffered 
generative, one-way, extended reflexivity. 
Brutus is further roused to action through letters apparently authored by citizens but 
which the audience know are sent by Cassius, which echo and seem to validate Cassius’s plea, 
calling on Brutus to awake and “see thyself;” this fission between audience and character 
perspectives heightens the pathos of Brutus’s credulity (2.1; 1.2.314-16). Brutus attempts yet 
fails to create introspectively the cognitive fission necessary for revelatory self-reflection. That 
Brutus’s internal fissures have been intensified by Cassius’s proferred reflexivity, he describes 
in a soliloquy in which he attempts to reason it out: 
 
Since Cassius first did whet me against Caesar, 
I have not slept. 
Between the acting of a dreadful thing 
And the first motion, all the interim is 
Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream: 
The Genius and the mortal instruments 
Are then in council; and the state of man, 
Like to a little kingdom, suffers then 
The nature of an insurrection. (2.1.61-69) 
 
Brutus’s internal prefiguring of civil uprising reflects the conventional understanding of the 
quasi-autonomous agencies that constitute the self, and the analogy between subject and world. 
Brutus here adopts a Dennettian “intentional stance” as a means to fathom his own mental 
unrest; however, it finally does not generate insights so much as a justificatory narrative. 
 Montaigne similarly describes the conflict created by his many-faceted mutability and 
the inferential stance consequently required, which he argues reflects a more general human 
predicament: 
 
I give my soul now one face, now another, according to which direction I turn 
it. If I speak of myself in different ways, that is because I look at myself in 
different ways . . . All contradictions may be found in me by some twist and in 
some fashion . . . and whoever studies himself really attentively finds in himself, 
yes, even in his judgment, this gyration and discord. (293-94) 
 
As in Brutus’s case, consciousness and self-consciousness are both problematically implicated, 
with this fissured experientiality iconically staged in the twists and turns of the multi-claused 
sentence structure. Both fictional and non-fictional narratives may convey the transparency and 
opacity of others (and oneself). Like Hohwy, Montaigne also argues that to minimize the 
tendency to make errors one must maintain distance from others’ viewpoints, though this is 
necessarily limited from the start by the extent to which the social is already within: it “is not 
enough to get away from the crowd; we must get away from the gregarious instincts that are 
inside us” in an attempt to “sequester and repossess ourselves” (213). Montaigne describes how 
we imagine as morally right what are actually inherited notions, as we confuse local customs 
with the natural laws of conscience and reason (100); the extended or collective mind is no 
more reliable than that of an individual. 
 Despite their collective intention to assassinate Caesar, with the basis for this a 
diachronic form of group mind borne out of their shared Roman blood and ancestors, fissions 
are also evident in the faction: in a farcical prefiguring of the misperceptions of the fatal battle, 
they cannot even agree which way (the literal and symbolic) dawn lies (2.1. 100-110). 
Similarly, despite their joint aim and sworn allegiance, Antony and Octavius later cannot agree 
who will attack from the left or right (5.1.16-20). Cassius’s transformation is also preceded by 
an internal fission, caused by Brutus’s moral upbraiding, though it is Brutus’s later confession 
of displaying ill temper himself that leads to reconciliation, alongside a misogynist (but 
conventional) casting off of Cassius’s outburst as generated by his mother: “When you are 
over-earnest with your Brutus, / He’ll think your mother chides, and leave you so” (4.3.121-
22). Thus a relegation of an internal aspect of Cassius’s character to an external agency allows 
for a renewed fusion of hands and hearts between Cassius and Brutus. 
 Cassius’s attempts to lead Brutus ultimately fail, as Brutus idealistically persuades him 
not to kill Antony, by describing Caesar and Antony as if they are one agent (composed of 
unequal parts) and claiming that “Our course will seem too bloody . . . / To cut the head off 
and then hack the limbs” (2.1.161-62). Cassius in the spirit of reconciliation is persuaded to set 
all on one ill-advised battle against his own will. It is, then, the choleric and cynical Cassius 
who is finally transformed from his much-cited statement of Epicurean self-determination, 
“The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, / But in ourselves, that we are underlings,” to the 
less-cited admission of the wider sphere of influences by which we are constituted: “Now I 
change my mind, / And partly credit things that do presage” (1.2.141-42, 5.1.77-78). As Werner 
Wolf and Brian Richardson have argued, narratives provide sense-making and world-modeling 
functions, with the representation of chance and causation providing privileged access to 
implied worldviews. 
 By the tragic end Cassius mirrors Brutus’s words in conformity not in coercion: 
 
BRUTUS For ever, and for ever, farewell, Cassius. 
 If we do meet again, why, we shall smile. 
 If not, why then, this parting was well made.  
CASSIUS For ever, and for ever, farewell, Brutus. 
 If we do meet again, we’ll smile indeed. 
 If not, ‘tis true this parting was well made. (5.3.117-22) 
 
The nostalgic mirroring of the narrative creates an electrifying intensity and yet hypnotic lulling 
through the uncanny mimicry of its reiteration. This reiteration transmits an echoing sensation, 
with a sense of looking forward and backward simultaneously via the counterfactual imagined 
futures. Against his original Machiavellian intentions Cassius ironically becomes the true 
mirror he claimed to be to Brutus. This is in keeping with the Platonic philosophy to which 
Brutus adhered, which is also the main source for the notion that like the eye, the mind sees 
not itself, and for the notion that the beloved and the lover mirror one another in a mutually 
reflexive relationship (Alcibiades 133b; Phaedrus, 255d-e). Adding a further layer of irony, 
Cassius’s “sight,” as he acknowledges at the end, was “ever thick,” a corporeal equivalent to 
his limited and clouded insight and foresight (5.3.21). That this brings his downfall in the battle, 
as victory is mistaken for defeat, is more poignantly wrought even than his assisted self-murder. 
Brutus is also subject to this blindness, in his failure to acknowledge the tension between his 
idealistic principles and the orgiastic assassination, his hypocritical demand of extorted money 
from Cassius, and his pretense of calm in the face of the already-known news of his wife 
Portia’s suicide. Cassius, like Brutus, is killed with the sword that killed Caesar (as if it 
revenges Caesar), and by the hand of his servant Pindarus, who is paradoxically freed by 
performing this act against his own will (5.3.44-45). Brutus and Cassius are assisted to their 
“suicides” by their fellows, closing the play with unresolved questions regarding the boundaries 
of agency; these fatal penetrations bring a fittingly masculine end to the tragic friends, an end 
that is heroic and all too human: as Antony eulogises over Brutus’s body: “This was a man!” 
(5.5.76). 
 
Conclusion 
 
 In Shakespeare’s plays we can observe the characters in dramatic performance in a way 
that is closer to real-world experience of narrative, which employs not only verbal but also 
gestural and embodied dynamics to relate sequences of events. Shakespeare and Montaigne 
evoke mental dispositions, beliefs, and desires as embodied and extended, but also as 
potentially fissured within an individual and between individuals. While the extended mind 
involves fusion between individuals, this may only be partial, and individual cognitive 
processing is also shown to involve fusion and fission between internal agencies, with neither 
fusion nor fission in either case necessarily positive or negative. Both Shakespeare and 
Montaigne explore a number of different forms of mind, including the group and the coupled 
mind, and the receptive and the generative faculties of the mind, so that helpful comparisons 
can be made with current notions of the social mind. Third-person perspectives, visual 
perception, and introspection are compared in terms of performing similar functions. 
Furthermore, Shakespeare deploys the affordance of the dramatic form to extend the collective 
mind from the characters to the audience, with Julius Caesar representing and playing upon 
notions of both the intramental and intermental as social and multiple. The mind is portrayed 
as constituted through ad hoc fusions and fissions that operate within and across skull and skin 
boundaries, with moments of transparency and opacity both in understanding one’s own mind, 
as well as that of others. Phenomenological experience is viewed as problematically being 
distorted by the mutable subject, whether or not one is relying on the intramental or intermental 
mind, yet this variably capacious and constrained mental panorama is also figured as having 
an (unreliable) capacity to reflect on itself, and finally, despite and because of it all, to be 
capable of cognitive reflexivity and reciprocity. 
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